Abstract. A market model with d assets in discrete time is considered where trades are subject to proportional transaction costs given via bid-ask spreads, while the existence of a numéraire is not assumed. It is shown that robust no arbitrage holds if, and only if, there exists a Pareto solution for some vector-valued utility maximization problem with component-wise utility functions. Moreover, it is demonstrated that a consistent price process can be constructed from the Pareto maximizer.
Introduction
The fundamental theorem of asset pricing (FTAP) has been studied extensively in various settings. In the FTAP, the equivalence of no arbitrage (NA) and the existence of an equivalent (super-)martingale measure is established. In market models with transaction costs, the martingale measures are usually replaced by consistent pricing systems (or processes). We refer to [1] and the references therein. There is also a stream of literature (e.g., [2, 7, 8] and the references therein) on general utility maximization with the presence of a numéraire in the market. In many papers, the existence of solutions (maximizers) is established, and one of the common assumptions is the absence of arbitrage. The easy-to-see fact that the converse is also true is well-known as well, i.e., the existence of a utility maximizer implies NA. For example, in [3, Section 3.1], the authors show both directions for a one-period market model without transaction costs which involves a numéraire. They show that no arbitrage is equivalent to the existence of a solution for some utility maximization problem. This result goes back to Rogers [10] who actually constructed equivalent martingale measures from utility maximizers.
The aim of this paper is to provide a corresponding result for market models with proportional transaction costs and a utility maximization problem with component-wise utility functions. This equivalence result between the existence of Pareto maximizers of a such vector-valued utility maximization problem and the well-established robust no-arbitrage condition (introduced in [13] ) underlines that from a mathematical point of view the very special case of "one utility function for each asset" is already enough. Moreover, there is some rational to this situation: the interpretation is that the market model rules the exchange of assets, while "utilities" (the images of a vector-valued utility function) cannot be exchanged into one another and are therefore compared by means of the order generated by R d + and not a solvency cone (which is usually bigger). It also seems more plausible to have a complete preference for positions of only one asset-instead of a complete preference for portfolio vectors as assumed very often in the literature. Compare [4] where this approach was initiated.
A financial market in discrete time is considered in which there are d tradable assets. The existence of a numéraire is not assumed; instead, following Kabanov [5] , the assets are considered in physical units where the exchange between these assets are subject to proportional transaction costs. We show that robust no arbitrage holds if, and only if, there exists a solution for some vector-valued utility maximization problem with respect to the order generated by R d + (a Pareto maximizer). A key step to prove the result is to apply Komlós's theorem to get the closedness of the set of the vector-valued expected utilities. We also show that a consistent price process can be constructed from the Pareto maximizer.
The note is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce the setup and the main results. In Section 3, we provide the proofs of the results.
2. The setup and the main result 2.1. Notation and background. We follow the setup in [13] . Let (Ω, (F t ) t=0,... ,T , P) be a filtered probability space in discrete time, where T ∈ N is the time horizon, and F 0 is assumed to be trivial. We assume that in the market there are d assets available for exchange. These assets could be interpreted as currencies, but this restriction is not necessary. The exchange of assets is subject to proportional transaction costs; we use it in the form of bid-ask processes as discussed in [13] .
An adapted process Π = (Π t ) t=0,... ,T is called a bid-ask process, if Π t (ω) is a bid-ask matrix for any (t, ω) ∈ {0, . . . , T } × Ω.
In the above definition, the entry π ij t in Π t denotes the number of units of asset i an investor needs in order to buy one unit of asset j at time t. That is, the bid-ask spread of asset i in terms of asset j is given by {1/π ji t , π ij t } at time t. For the bid-ask matrix Π 0 = (π ij ), let −K(Π 0 ) be the convex cone generated by the vectors {−e i , −π ij e i + e j , i, j = 1, . . . , d}, where e i = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) with the i-th component equal to 1. In other words, −K(Π 0 ) represents the set of portfolios available starting from initial position 0 ∈ R d for the assets. Denote K * (Π 0 ) as the polar of the cone −K(Π 0 ). That is,
where ·, · represents the inner product. For any bid-ask process Π = (Π t ) t=0,... ,T , similar definitions apply for −K(Π t (ω)) and
Let us recall the definition of self-financing portfolios in [13] .
.. ,T is called a self-financing portfolio process (from initial position 0) for the bid-ask process Π = (Π t ) t=0,... ,T , if for t = 0, . . . , T ,
where v −1 ≡ 0. Denote
for some self-financing portfolio process (v t ) t=0,... ,T in terms of Π}.
Recall the notion of (robust) no arbitrage introduced in [13] . Let us also recall the definition of (strictly) consistent price processes.
.. ,T is called a consistent (strictly consistent, respectively) price process for the bid-ask process Π, if Z is a P-martingale, and
be concave, continuous, strictly increasing, and bounded from above, representing the utility function for asset i.
For a given initial endowment
where
. Moreover, we also consider the set
The meaning of the word "maximize" in (2.1) has to be defined. We will consider two variants. First, we recall the definition of a Pareto maximizer with respect to the ordering cone R d + and a domination property which is also called (upper) external stability in the literature. For yet another notion, compare Remark 2.9 below.
The set of Pareto maximal points of M is denoted by Max M .
(b) A set M ⊆ R d is said to satisfy the upper domination property if for each z ∈ M there iŝ
The set of Pareto maximizers for (2.1) is denoted by P Π (U )(x).
One may easily realize thatX T ∈ P Π (U )(x) if, and only if, there does not exist
. The study of the vector-valued utility maximization problem (2.1) was initiated in [14] and [15] , the former containing a certainty equivalent, the latter duality results in a one-period setup with a finite probability space which were published in [4] . In [16] , the problem is studied with each of the components of the utility function depending on all the components of the commodity vector in a deterministic and set-valued framework. In [12] , further certainty equivalents as well as indifference prices are defined also for a finite probability space.
Main results.
The following two results, Proposition 2.7 and Theorem 2.8, establish the equivalence between no arbitrage and the existence of a Pareto optimizer for (2.1).
Proposition 2.7. Let Π be a bid-ask process. If NA r holds with respect to Π, then J Π (U )(x) satisfies the upper domination property. In particular, P Π (U ) = ∅.
Conversely, if P Π (U ) = ∅, then NA holds with respect to Π.
Theorem 2.8. NA r holds with respect to the bid-ask process Π if, and only if, there exists a bid-ask processΠ with smaller bid-ask spreads satisfying PΠ(U ) = ∅.
Remark 2.9. A comment on the above results might be in order. The function X T → E P U (X T ) can straightforwardly be extended to a function F mapping into the set G(
is a complete lattice. The first part of Proposition 2.7 can now be read as follows: NA r implies the existence of a solution of the set optimization problem (in the completelattice sense, see, e.g., [11, Definition 28, Corollary 2.9]) maximize F (X T ) subject to X T ∈ A Π (x). This follows from [11, Proposition 2.15] (adapted to maximization), and in this reference more material about the treatment of vector optimization as complete lattice-valued problems can be found.
Thus, roughly speaking, Theorem 2.8 yields that robust no arbitrage is equivalent to the existence of solutions of the complete lattice extension of some vector-valued utility maximization problem. One should note that the existence of such a solution does not imply the domination property.
Motivated by [3, Corollary 3.10], we also establish the following wo results which provide a construction of a (strictly) consistent price process from a Pareto maximizer. Proposition 2.10. Let NA r hold with respect to the bid-ask process Π and letX T ∈ P Π (U ). Assume that U i is differentiable for all i = 1, . . . , d, and that there exists
defines a consistent price process for Π.
Corollary 2.11. Let NA r hold with respect to the bid-ask process Π, and thus NA r still holds with respect to someΠ with smaller bid-ask spreads. LetX T ∈ PΠ(U ). Assume that U i is differentiable for all i = 1, . . . , d, and that there exists
defines a strictly consistent price process for Π.
Proof of the results
Lemma 3.1. Assume NA r holds with respect to Π. Then for any sequence
Proof. By [13, Theorem 1.7] , there exists a strictly consistent price process (Z t ) t=0,... ,T . For i = 1, . . . , d, define
Then, Q i is a probability measure that is equivalent to
where the second (in)equality follows from the fact that the components of Z T and X T are all nonnegative a.s., and the third (in)equality follows from [13,
T ). First, consider the first component, i.e., the sequence (X n,1 T ) n∈N . Since from (3.1) 
Next, consider the sequence (X
T ) n∈N for the second component. Applying Komlós's theorem again, we have that there exist a subsequence (X
Obviously, (3.2) still holds if we replace the (X
) l∈N . Repeating this process for the remaining components, we can finally get a subsequence (ζ i ) i∈N ⊂ (X n T ) n∈N and an
Proof of Proposition 2.7. First, let us show the first statement of this proposition. Assume that NA r holds with respect to Π. It suffices to show that the set J Π (U )(x) ⊂ R d is closed. Indeed, if this is the case, then the set ( 
In order to show the closedness of J Π (U )(x), take (X n T ) n∈N ⊂ A Π (x), such that
By Lemma 3.1, there exists a subsequence (X
As U i is concave, i = 1, . . . , d, we have that
where the inequality is component-wise. As U is continuous and bounded from above, by Fatou's Lemma, one has
and U i is continuous for i = 1, . . . , d, there existsỸ ∈ A Π (x), such that E P U (Ỹ ) = a. This completes the proof of the first statement.
Next, let us prove the second statement. LetX T ∈ A Π (x) be a Pareto maximizer for (2.1). If NA fails with respect to Π, then there would exist someX T = (X 1 T , . . . ,X d T ) ∈ A Π , such that for any i ∈ {1, . . . , d},X i T ≥ 0 a.s., and for some i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, P{X i T > 0} > 0. ThenX T +X T ∈ A Π (x), and for any i ∈ {1, . . . , d},
and for some i ∈ {1, . . . , d},
. This contradicts the Pareto optimality ofX T .
Proof of Theorem 2.8. If NA r holds with respect to Π, then there existsΠ with smaller bid-ask spreads, such that NA r also holds with respect toΠ. By Proposition 2.7 one has PΠ(U ) = ∅.
Conversely, if PΠ(U ) = ∅ for someΠ with smaller bid-ask spreads, then by Proposition 2.7 NA holds with respect toΠ, and thus NA r holds with respect to Π.
Proof of Proposition 2.10. SinceX T is a Pareto optimizer for (2.1), by [9, Proposition 9, page 497] there exists λ = (λ 1 , . . . , λ d ) ∈ R d + \{0}, such thatX T is also optimal for the scalar-valued maximization problem sup
) and u t (·) ≥ −δ/2 a.s. SinceX T + ǫu t ∈ A Π (x) for any ǫ ∈ (0, 1) andX T is optimal for (3.3), we have that
Letting ǫ ց 0 and applying the dominated convergence theorem, we get that
Therefore,
Let us show that
Indeed, if the above fails to be true, then there exists an F t -measurablew t (·) ∈ −K(Π t (·)) such that
Then there exists c > 0 such that
Denote the set in the above as B. If we replace u t in (3.4) byw t := cw t 1 B , then the inequality (3.4) fails, which yields a contradiction.
Proof of Corollary 2.11. The result follows from Proposition 2.10 and [13, Proposition A.5].
Contribution of the authors. The first author conjectured the results of this paper (in form of Proposition 2.7 and Remark 2.9); this conjecture is already mentioned in [14, 15] supervised by the first author regarding the content. The equivalence problem for solutions of vector-utility functions and (robust) no arbitrage for markets with transaction costs was among the open problems given by the first author to the second for discussion at the AMS Mathematics Research Community 2015 in Financial Mathematics. The collaboration of the second and the third author at this summer school led to the proof of this conjecture.
